We study an optimization problem capturing a core operational question for online retailing platforms.
Introduction
The growth of online retailing has created new opportunities for algorithmic techniques to improve the shopper's experience and drive customer engagement and revenue growth. One such opportunity is optimizing the selection and order of products in response to a search query. In a typical online retailing scenario, upon receiving a search query from a shopper, the platform displays a relevant assortment of products. These products, which can range from grocery items in Amazon Fresh to a list of restaurants on OpenTable, are ranked by the platform, typically in a vertical list.
The online shopper then scrolls down this list, to a point depending on her time and patience, in order to find her favorite product. Based on a model of user behavior, the online platform ranks the products in a way that optimizes certain performance metrics. In this paper, we consider two of the most widely-used performance metrics.
1. User Engagement is a key metric for any online service and retailing platforms are not exceptions. In our context, we define it as how likely it is that a visitor to the website clicks on one of the products she browses.
2. Revenue is also an important financial metric for a firm. Online retailing platforms have various ways of extracting revenue from sellers that can generally be categorized under one of the following schemes: (1) pay-per-impression, (2) pay-per-click, and (3) pay-per-transaction.
At a high level, we study the platform's problem of ranking the products in the presence of users with various browsing behaviors and tastes with respect to these two objective functions.
The platform offers n products to the customers. When a user visits the website, the platform has the opportunity of presenting her with a permutation π : [n] → [n] of these products. The platform knows the probability distribution of the patience level of the customer (i.e., how far the customer is likely to scroll down and browse the products). Let λ i denote the probability that the customer has patience level i, i.e., she browses the first i products on the list.
The platform also has an estimation on how likely it is that a customer with patience level i browsing a set S of products clicks on some product during her browsing. We assume that this is given by monotone submodular set functions f i (S), where S is the set of the top i products in the ranking. As we will discuss in detail in Section 2, such functions can capture a variety of choice models considered in the current literature on assortment optimization and online retailing.
Finally, we assume a revenue structure in which the customer receives a monetary payment r i,j for showing product j in rank i in addition to a constant amount K for each click made by the user.
We consider two problems of interest for the platform.
1. Maximizing User Engagement. Some online platforms mainly focus on maximizing their market share through improving user engagement. One such example is Wayfair (www.wayfair.com), a multi-billion dollar online retailer of home goods (Ferreira et al. 2019) .
For these platforms, we consider the problem of maximizing user engagement, i.e., maximize π n i=1 λ i f i ({π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i }).
2. Maximizing Revenue Subject to Lower Bound on Engagement. Most platforms aim at maximizing revenue, while trying to keep a certain level of market share. In this paper, we focus on the first two schemes of extracting revenue, namely, pay-per-impression and pay-per-click, and omit pay-per-transaction. We assume that the platform charges r i,j for showing product i at location j in addition to a fixed dollar amount K per click. One such example is OpenTable (www.opentable.com), another multi-billion dollar online platform that provides restaurant reservation services (OpenTable 2010) . For such platforms, we consider the following problem for a given target level T for user engagement. maximize π 1≤i≤n r i,π i + K 1≤i≤n λ i f i ({π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i }) subject to 1≤i≤n λ i f i ({π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i }) ≥ T.
We call functions of the form i λ i f i ({π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i } sequentially submodular. Subsequently, the maximization problems that contain such functions in the objective (and perhaps constraints) are called sequential submodular maximization problems. In this paper, we initiate the study of sequential submodular maximization problems and provide approximation algorithms for them.
For the problem of maximizing user engagement, our main contribution is an optimal 1 − 1/e approximation algorithm for this problem. On the technical side, our algorithm is based on a reduction of the problem of sequential submodular maximization to the classic problem of submodular maximization subject to a (laminar) matroid constraint. Our reduction relies on two major technical components. The first component is lifting the problem to a larger space where every element is copied n times, and then defining a specific submodular function and laminar matroid in this larger space that capture the objective function and the new combinatorial aspect of our problem, i.e., returning a permutation rather than a set. The second component is a post-processing rounding algorithm that given a feasible base of the mentioned matroid returns a permutation by only increasing the objective function. For the reduced problem, we use the known approximation algorithm for monotone submodular functions subject to matroids (Calinescu et al. 2011) , which works by running the continuous greedy algorithm on the multi-linear extension of our submodular function, accompanied with the pipage rounding algorithm to return a feasible base of the laminar matroid. Putting all these pieces together allows us to provide an optimal (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing user engagement -an unconstrained sequential submodular maximization problem. We note that this generalizes the result of Ferreira et al. (2019) who provide a 1/2-approximation ratio for the special case of this problem where the underlying submodular functions are coverage functions.
For the problem of maximizing revenue subject to lower bound on engagement, our main contribution is a bi-criteria approximation algorithm, that is, an algorithm where the objective is approximately optimized and the constraint is approximately satisfied . At the heart of our algorithm, lies a novel characterization of the polytope of all feasible policies (deterministic or randomized) for ranking products. Unfortunately, this polytope can only be described using exponential number of variables and (doubly) exponential number of constraints. In order to overcome this obstacle, we solve a simpler polynomial-size relaxation linear program using Ellipsoid method which approximates the optimal solution over the polytope of feasible policies. The main technical ingredient of this approximation is a contention resolution scheme (Chekuri et al. 2014 ) defined on a laminar matroid that captures the combinatorial properties of permutations, and further bounding the integrality gap using correlation gap for submodular functions (Agrawal et al. 2010) . We believe our approach to define the polytope of feasible ranking policies and finding approximate solution to submodular optimization problems defined over it could be of independent interest.
Related Work
A work closely related to ours is that of Ferreira et al. (2019) who, in the context of online retailing, consider the problem of ranking assortments with the objective of maximizing engagement. This problem is a special case of sequential submodular optimization, where the submodular functions of interest are all coverage functions. Ferreira et al. (2019) provide a 0.5-approximation greedy algorithm for this problem (while showing a (1−1/e)-approximation is admissible under the assumption that click probabilities and patience levels are independent). They eventually feed their algorithm to an online "learning-then-earning" algorithm which poses the interesting question of whether or not our algorithm can be turned into an online learning algorithm as well.
Also important is the nice result of Golrezaei et al. (2018) , who also study product ranking in online platforms. Their models of customer behavior and product ranking are different from ours in crucial ways, and therefore the results are not quantitatively comparable.
Our work is also related to the practice of display advertising. The platform's decision on which ads to show and in what order, in different pages of a website (e.g., in different sections of an online newspaper) or within a given page (e.g., throughout a long article) is closely related to the information the platform has access to, regarding both the browsing and clicking behavior of the users. A long stream of works, both in marketing literature (see for instance Anand and Shachar 2011 and Hoban and Bucklin 2015) and in optimization literature (see for instance, Ghosh et al. 2009 , Balseiro et al. 2014 , Aouad and Segev 2015 , and Sayedi 2018 ) study various aspects of this problem. In particular, the trade-off between engagement (as an indicator of the quality of service) and revenue (as an indicator of performance) in online advertising has been a topic of investigation from the optimization perspective (see for instance, Lahaie and Pennock 2007 and Radlinski et al. 2008 ). In case of display advertising, Zhu et al. (2009) provide a machine learning algorithm for jointly maximizing revenue while providing high quality ads.
From a methodological point of view, our work fits within the literature of submodular optimization. The main technical challenge of our work is due to the less-considered set of feasible solutions (i.e., permutations) we deal with. Part of our technical contribution (Section 3) is a machinery that relates the problem of sequential submodular optimization to the classic problem of submodular optimization over matroids, hence, allowing us to use the rich body of work on the subject (for instance, see Calinescu et al. 2011) . We believe that this machinery could be of independent interest.
Our work is also closely related to assortment planning which is the study of optimally presenting a subset of products to a user. Assortment optimization has an extensively growing literature over recent decades. We refer the reader to related surveys and books (cf. Kök et al. 2008a , Lancaster 1990 , Ho and Tang 1998 for a comprehensive study. Later work have considered various consumer choice models, e.g., multinomial logit models (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004 , Liu and van Ryzin 2008 , Topaloglu 2013 , the Lancaster choice model (Gaur and Honhon 2006) , ranked-list preference (Honhon et al. 2010 , Goyal et al. 2016 , and non-parametric (data-driven) choice model (Farias et al. 2013 ). The main difference of our model with the assortment optimization literature is that we optimize over permutations of products rather than subsets.
Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to formalizing the model and notations. We discuss the customer choice model and the platforms' problem in detail and characterize sequential submodular maximization problems. In Section 3 we study the user engagement problem. Finally, in Section 4 we study the problem of maximizing revenue subject to a lower bound on user engagement.
Model and Notations
Consider an online platform presenting n products to users in a ranked list. Denote the set of products with [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the set of all permutations over [n] with Π. The platform chooses a permutation π ∈ Π to rank the products presented to a user u, knowing the distribution D from which u is selected. User u has a type specified by a pair (θ u , κ u (·)). He or she inspects the first θ u products in the list and makes a click with probability κ u ({π 1 , π 2 · · · π θu }).
We assume κ u (·) is a monotone non-decreasing and submodular set function for every u. This is a natural assumption consistent with a wide range of choice functions including multinomial logit, nested logit, mixture of multinomial logit functions, and the paired combinatorial logit (see Kök et al. (2008b) for definitions of these models and how they are used in practice). Another example is the general choice function arising from the class of random utility models, in which the value of user u for product i is a random variable V ui . The user is unit-demand and chooses the item with the highest value from the consideration subset S, but only if the value of that item is at least R, namely, the value of the outside option. In that case, κ u (S) = Pr[max i∈S (V ui ) > R] is monotone submodular as well, even for possibly correlated values {V ui }.
Maximizing User Engagement In Section 3, we focus on finding an ordering π to maximize the expected probability of click E u∼D [κ u (·)]. We call this problem maximizing user engagement.
The formulation of this problem can be simplified with a change of variables. For each i ∈ [n],
The probability that the user makes a click is then given by F (π) defined as
where f i (·)'s are monotone submodular functions and λ i 's are non-negative.
In the problem of maximizing user engagement, the platform solves the following problem. maximize π∈Π F (π).
(1)
Note that maximizing the expected user welfare under the random utility models can also be cast as an example of the above problem by a small change in the definition of f i (·)'s, that is,
For consistency, we limit our attention to the user engagement formulation.
Maximizing Revenue We also consider the platform's problem of maximizing its revenue in Section 4. Online retailers typically have multiple sources of revenue. They may charge sellers for the placement of their product, clicks on its description, and finally if the user makes a transaction.
In this paper, we focus on the first two sources of revenue. Suppose the platform receives a monetary payment of r i,j for placing product j in position i. It is reasonable to assume that r i,j 's are monotone non-increasing in i. In addition, assume the platform collects a constant amount K for each click made by the users. The total expected revenue generated by the platform thus becomes
In the problem of maximizing revenue subject to a lower bound on the user engagement, the platform solves the following problem.
subject to F (π) ≥ T.
Note that in this problem, both the objective and the constraint involve sequentially submodular functions. Hence, one can only hope for a bi-criteria approximation solution where the objective is approximately optimized and the constraint is approximately satisfied.
Definition 1 (Bi-criteria Approximation Ratio). Let π * denote the optimum permutation for the optimization problem (2). We call an algorithm a (α, β)-approximation if it finds a permutationπ where F (π) ≥ αF (π * ) and G(π) ≥ βT .
Maximizing User Engagement
In this section, we study the problem of maximizing user engagement which (as discussed in
Section 2) can be modeled as the optimization problem (1). The well-studied problem of monotone submodular maximization subject to a cardinality constraint k is in fact a special case of this problem, as it can be reduced to this problem by setting λ k = 1 and λ k = 0 for k = k. Hence no approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e is achievable, unless P = N P .
A natural algorithm for this problem is probably a naive greedy algorithm, that is, picking the item with the maximum marginal gain to F (·) as the next item in the ordering π. See Algorithm 1.
For particular special cases of our problem, e.g., for the assortment ranking problem in Ferreira et al. (2019) where the click probabilities and attention window lengths are independent, the approximation ratio of greedy is known to be (1 − 1/e) (cf. Ferreira et al. 2019) . Interestingly, unlike the mentioned special cases, the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm for the general submodular version of our problem is exactly 1/2. The proof of the approximation ratio and the tightness example are rather straightforward, but we mention them here for completeness.
Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm
2: Output: permutation π approximately maximizing i∈[n] λ i f i ({π 1 , . . . , π i }).
3: π ← ().
4:
For i = 1 to n, 5:
n j=i λ j f j ({π 1 , . . . , π i−1 , p}) − n j=i λ j f j ({π 1 , . . . , π i−1 }).
6:
π ← (π 1 , . . . , π i−1 , p) 7: return π.
Proposition 1. The greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) is a 1/2 approximation algorithm for maximizing user engagement as defined in (1).
Proof. Suppose the optimal permutation is (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ). We have:
F (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i ) − F (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i−1 ) ≥ F (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i−1 , y i ) − F (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π i−1 ) .
Now consider the following sum:
We claim the value of eq. (4) is at least F (y 1 , . . . , y n ). This is because each function f i is monotone submodular and the value added to (4) by function f i is:
where the first inequality follows by submodularity and the second inequality follows by monotonicity. Summing above inequalities for i = 1, . . . , n proves the claim. Therefore by (3), we have:
which shows the approximation ratio of 1/2.
Example 1. Consider two products 1 and 2, and two users 1 and 2 that each appear with probability 1 2 . We assume the selection probability functions of the users κ 1 (·) and κ 2 (·) are linear, and the probability of click on product 1 is 1 for user 1 and 0 for user 2 and the probability of click on product 2 is 0 for user 1 and 1 + for user 2. In this case, the greedy algorithm will pick the ordering (2, 1) which achieves expected user engagement of 1 + , whereas picking the order (1, 2) would achieve an expected user engagement of 2 + .
The main result of this section is showing the optimal (1 − 1/e) approximation ratio for the user engagement problem. We present Algorithm 2 and prove it attains this approximation ratio.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 is a (1 − 1/e) approximation algorithm for maximizing user engagement as defined in (1). No polynomial-time algorithm can obtain a better approximation ratio unless
Proof. We reduce the problem to submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint for which we know there exists a 1 − 1/e approximation due to Calinescu et al. (2011) . The underlying matroid M(V, I) is as follows. The ground set V contains n 2 elements 1 j , 2 j , . . . , n j . Each element i j corresponds to placing product j in position i in the permutation. The family of independent sets I is defined by a laminar family A and a capacity function c(·) on A, such that a set R ⊆ V is
Algorithm 2 Optimal Approximation Algorithm for Maximizing User Engagement
4: Define the monotone submodular function g : 2 V → R as
where T i is defined as 6: For each j ∈ [n], let q(j) be the smallest i for which i j ∈R, and n + 1 if no such i exists.
7: Sort the products in increasing order of their q(·) values and call this permutation π.
8: Return π. and the capacity function c(A k ) is equal to k.
Given f 1 (·), f 2 (·), . . . f n (·), the function g(·) is defined for each R ⊆ V as
The problem of maximizing the linear combination of f i (·)'s over the space of all permutations reduces (in polynomial time) to optimizing g(·) over all the independent subsets of the laminar matroid M. We show this by first converting any feasible solution R ⊆ V , potentially resulting from maximizing or approximately maximizing g(·) over M, into a set S corresponding to a permutation π such that g(S) ≥ g(R). Then we show that the linear combination of f i (·)'s over π has the same value as g(S), which proves the reduction. The final approximation guarantee is proved by further showing that the optimal objective value of the former problem is no smaller than the latter problem, as any permutation π can be naturally mapped to a set R ∈ I such that g(R) = F (π).
First, we establish the main properties of g(·).
Claim 1. The function g : 2 |V | → R is monotone and submodular.
Proof. To prove this, we need to show that for any two subsets R, R ⊆ V such that R ⊆ R , the following two properties hold:
To do this, let
By definition, we must have
Where T i and T i are defined as follows,
This proves property 1. To see property 2, note that for any i j ∈ V ,
Again since each f i is submodular, we have for each i ∈ [n],
which proves the second property.
Claim 2. Given a set R ∈ I, we can create a permutation π ∈ Π such that F (π) ≥ g(R).
Proof. For each product j ∈ [n], we define q(j) to be the smallest i ∈ [n] such that i j ∈ R, and n + 1 if no such i exists. We then sort the products based on their q(·) values (we arbitrarily break the ties) to get a permutation π. We claim that F (π) ≥ g(R).
To see this, consider a product j. Since R ∈ I, we must have
where I i j ∈R is the indicator variable which has value 1 if i j ∈ R and 0 otherwise. This inequality implies that the position at which each product j appears in π has to be less that or equal to q(j).
Therefore, by definition, we must have F (π) ≥ g(R).
Proof. Suppose π = arg max π∈Π F (π). Let R = {1 π(1) , 2 π(2) , . . . , n π(n) }.
Observe that R ∈ I and by definition of g(·), g(R) = F (π).
Putting everything together, due to Claim 1, and the result of Calinescu et al. (2011) , we can findR ∈ I in polynomial time such that g(R) ≥ (1 − 1/e) max R∈I g(R). Claim 3 shows that g(R) ≥
(1 − 1/e) max π∈Π F (π). Finally by Claim 2, we can turnR into a permutation π (same as the one created by Algorithm 2) such that
which finishes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
To prove the hardness, as mentioned earlier, note that for the special case where all the functions f i are coverage functions, this problem reduces (in an approximation preserving way) to maximum coverage problem for which a 1 − 1/e hardness of approximation is known. Therefore, unless P = N P , no polynomial time algorithm can achieve a better than 1 − 1/e approximation.
Remark 1. As we mentioned earlier, no policy can achieve a better than (1 − 1/e)-approximation even when f i (·)'s are coverage functions. Coverage functions have appeared in special cases of our problem studied in previous work (e.g., Ferreira et al. (2019) ). For such functions, it is possible to get a (1 − 1/e)-approximation using an LP-based approach which might be of independent interest.
We present this result in Appendix A.
Remark 2. Instead of defining a laminar matroid, it is tempting to directly optimize g(·) over the space of subsets that correspond to permutations. More specifically, we can treat each element i j ∈ V as an edge between position i and product j and then maximize g(·) over the space of perfect matchings. We show in Appendix B why this approach does not work.
Maximizing Revenue Subject to Lower Bound on Engagement
In this section we consider the scenario where the platform is interested in finding a permutation of products that maximizes the revenue subject to the user engagement not dropping below a certain threshold T , as defined in eq. (2).
The reduction we used in the previous section no longer holds. To solve this problem, we first characterize the polytope of feasible deterministic or randomized policies for ranking products by a linear program with exponential number of variables and constraints. We use this polytope to setup a linear program for the optimal revenue policy subject to a lower bound on user engagement. We will then drop some of the variables and constraints of the linear program to make it polynomially solvable and show how the objective value of this relaxed LP is an upper bound on the original LP, and therefore the optimal revenue maximizing solution. We use this LP to develop our bi-criteria approximately optimal policy, that is, a policy that in terms of revenue obtains a constant fraction of the optimal objective, and it terms of user engagement satisfies the threshold condition up to a constant factor.
Polytope of Feasible Ranking Policies
Define a feasible policy for the product ranking problem to be a procedure which starts with an empty list, and keeps adding products one by one at the end of the list until it ends up with a permutation. The choice of the elements at every step can deterministic or randomized.
For every i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ [n] with |S| = i, let x i,S represent the probability that the set of the first i elements in the permutation is S. We say an assignment of values to x is implementable, if there exists a feasible policy so that for every set S ⊆ [n] of size i, the probability that it places the products in set S in the first i positions is exactly x i,S . Given x, we can find the probability of product j being at position i by x i,j = S⊆[n],|S|=i,S j x i,S − S⊆[n],|S|=i−1,S j x i−1,S . Thus, the expected revenue of the policy that implements x can be written as 1≤i,j≤n
We will next identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability of x.
Proposition 2. The vector x is implementable by a feasible policy, if and only if (i) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have S⊆[n] ,|S|=i x i,S = 1.
(ii) For any collection C of subsets of [n] with size 1 ≤ i < n, we have:
where N (C) is the collection of all the subsets of [n] with size i + 1, such that for any T ∈ N (C), there exists a set S ∈ C such that S ⊂ T .
Proof. We first show the easy direction. Every policy by definition fills all the positions with a product, so there exists a set S of size exactly i that is placed in the first i positions. Thus, it satisfies condition (i). For condition (ii), consider a collection C of subsets of [n] with size i. Suppose π is the permutation generated by the policy. Note that N (C) = {S ∪ {j} : S ∈ C, j / ∈ S}. Therefore,
For the opposite direction, suppose x satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). We will show how to construct a policy with assignment probabilities equal to x. To do this, observe that we can check implementability of x "layer by layer". Assume for every S ⊆ [n] with cardinality equal to i, the probability that the set of first i products in the permutations generated by the policy to be S is equal to x i,S . We want to check if there exists a way to add an additional product at position i + 1, such that for every S ⊆ [n] with cardinality i + 1, the probability that the set formed by the first i + 1 products in the permutation to be S is x i+1,S . We call this property implementability of layer i + 1. It is clear from the definition that if x is implementable, then all the layers 1 ≤ i ≤ n are implementable as well. In addition, If all the layers 1 ≤ i ≤ n are implementable, then x is implementable.
In order to check the implementability of a layer, we use a max flow argument. Construct a flow network G, consisting of a node v i,S for each subset S ⊆ [n], |S| = i and a node v i+1,S for each subset S ⊆ [n], |S| = i + 1. For any two subsets S ⊂ T of size i and i + 1, respectively, there exists an edge from v i,S to v i+1,T with capacity 1. We also have a source s and a sink t. The source is connected to each node v i,S with capacity x i,S and each node v i+1,T is connected to the sink with capacity
x i+1,T . Note that the sum of the capacity of edges exiting the source and entering the sink are both 1 due to condition (i). See Figure 1 for more details. 
To see the only if direction, suppose layer i + 1 is implementable. Let P p,S be the probability that the policy implementing layer i + 1 places product p ∈ [n] \ S at position i + 1, conditioned on the first i products are set S. We define a feasible flow of 1 as follows. Let the flow from s to each node v i,S be x i,S . Similarly, let the flow from each node v i+1,T to t be x i+1,T . For any node v i,S and any p ∈ [n] \ S, let the flow from v i,S to v i+1,S∪{p} be x i,S · P p,S . Note that we have p∈S P p,S = 1 and therefore the inflow and outflow for each node v i,S are equal. In addition, due to implementability, we must have for any T ⊆ [n] with |T | = i + 1, p∈T x i,S\{p} · P p,T \{p} = x i+1,T and therefore the inflow and outflow for each node v i+1,T are equal. So, we have a feasible flow of 1 from s to t.
Finally, we show that there exists a flow of 1 from s to t at each layer if and only if the second property holds. This in fact holds because of the generalized Hall's matching theorem for network flows (Hall 1935) , or equivalent versions of the max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson 1958) . Therefore, because of Lemma 1, all the layers are implementable.
Given that all layers are implementable, we construct our final policy as follows. We start with an empty sequence, and at each step we add a new product at the end of the current sequence.
If at step i the set of added products so far is S, at step i + 1 we select productp ∈ Given Proposition 2, we can define the polytope of feasible policies for the product ranking problem, denoted by P, as follows. Note that variables are {x i,S }, where x i,S basically represents the probability that set S is the set of first i th elements realized by the policy:
where C i is the power set of all the subsets of [n] with size i. The first two constraints are conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2. Now suppose we are interested in the revenue maximizing policy that keeps the user engagement above some threshold T . Given P, the LP to find such a policy is
..,n,S∈C i ∈ P
In the above LP, the first constraint computes the value of x i,j using the definition of x i,S , the second constraint is enforcing the solution to keep user engagement above T , and the third constraint guarantees the solution x to be implementable. Unfortunately, this LP has exponentially many variables and (doubly) exponentially many constraints which renders it unsolvable. We will show in the next section how we can drop some of these constraints and only keep polynomially many constraints without the objective value increasing by much. This will allow us to approximately solve the relaxed LP in polynomial time and round its solution to get a constant factor bi-criteria approximation policy.
The Bi-criteria Approximately Optimal Policy
The linear program LP1 has exponentially many variables and (doubly) exponentially many constraints and thus is not solvable exactly. We are also not aware of any techniques to obtain an approximately optimal solution of this LP directly. To circumvent these issues, we try to find a relaxation for this program that has exponentially many variables, but polynomially many constraints. We then consider the dual of the program that has polynomially many variables and exponentially many constraints. Finally, we try to find an approximately optimal separation oracle for the dual, and by employing the ellipsoid method we obtain an approximately optimal solution for the primal.
More formally, define C i,j {S ⊆ [n] | |S| = i, j ∈ S}. Now we relax the program by only considering constraints C ∈ C i that are among {C i,1 , . . . , C i,n }. Based on our definition of x i,j , these constraints correspond to ∀i, j ∈ [n] :
x i,j ≥ 0.
We further change some of the constraints of the linear program LP1 from equality to inequality and obtain the following relaxation.
Remark 1. The objective value of the above LP is clearly an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal policy since we just relaxed some of the constraints. In Section C, we show by a computeraided example that the objective value of LP2 might in fact be strictly more than the revenue of the optimal policy. See Example 2 for more details.
In the rest of this section, we first present an approach for finding a permutation of products that achieves constant fraction of T as its user engagement, and a constant fraction of the optimal objective value of LP2 as its revenue. We present an overview of our approach in Algorithm 3 and then describe how to carry out each step of the algorithm in what follows.
Putting everything together, we prove this theorem, which is the main result of the section.
Theorem 2. Given values {r i,j } i,j∈[n] and functions {f i } i∈ [n] , and a lower bound T on user engagement, Algorithm 3 finds a permutation π in polynomial time, such that 1. The revenue generated by π is within factor (1 − 1/e) 3 of the objective value of LP2 (which is at least the revenue of the optimal policy satisfying the lower bound T on user engagement).
2. The user engagement generated by π is at least T (1 − 1/e) 3 .
Therefore, it is a bi-criteria ((1 − 1/e) 3 , (1 − 1/e) 3 )-approximation algorithm, where (1 − 1/e) 3 ≈ 0.25. 
is a (1 − 1/e)-balanced contention resolution scheme for matroid M as described in Chekuri et al. (2014) . 9: For each j ∈ [n], let q(j) be the smallest i for which i j ∈ R * , and n + 1 if no such i exists.
10: Sort the products in increasing order of their q(.) values and call this permutation π. 11: Output π.
Detailed Steps of Algorithm 3 and Proof of Theorem 2
We start by the following technical lemma, which essentially shows how to find a fractional approximately optimal solution to our relaxed linear program LP2.
Lemma 2. Given values {r i,j } i,j∈[n] and functions {f i } i∈ [n] , and a lower bound T on user engagement, we can find a solution x * to LP2 in polynomial time such that 1. This solution attains an objective value at least (1 − 1/e) fraction of the optimal objective value of LP2.
2. This solution satisfies the second constraint approximately, i.e., i∈[n] S⊆[n],|S|=i
and all the other constraints exactly.
Proof. We approximately optimize a linear program slightly different from LP2, and then show how the obtained solution of this modified LP relates to the solution of the original linear program, LP2. We start by writing the dual of LP2.
Define ModifiedLP2 to be the same as LP2, with the exception that the fourth constraint is replaced with S⊆[n],|S|=i
Also let ModifiedDual be the dual of ModifiedLP2. Therefore, ModifiedDual must be the same as Dual but the objective value is replaced with i∈[n] e e − 1 α i − γT.
Note that given any potential solution to ModifiedDual, we can separate all of its constraints in polynomial time except the first one. To get around this issue, we use the following result due to Sviridenko et al. (2017) .
Proposition 3 (Sviridenko et al. 2017) . For every , there is an algorithm that, given a monotone increasing submodular function g : 2 X → R ≥0 , a linear function l : 2 X → R, and a matroid M, where M is the i uniform matroid. Using Proposition 3, we can approximately separate the first constraint for any i. Let the solution of ModifiedDual obtained by the ellipsoid method using this approximate separation oracle be {α 0 i } i∈[n] , γ 0 , {β 0 i,j } i,j∈ [n] . These variables must satisfy the following
Now we define
Let OPT(Dual) be the objective of the optimal solution to Dual and letÔ PT(ModifiedDual) be the objective value of the solution obtained by the ellipsoid method when using our approximate separation oracle to solve ModifiedDual. Note that
are a feasible solution to Dual, and therefore, we must havê
Now consider the set of all the constraints detected by the ellipsoid method while solving Modi-fiedDual using our approximate separation oracle and call it R. Define RestrictedDual to be the same as ModifiedDual but only restricted to constraint in R. Similarly, define RestrictedLP2 to be the same as ModifiedLP2 but only restricted to variables corresponding to constraints in R.
Note that the size of R must be polynomial since we know the ellipsoid method runs in polynomial time. Therefore RestrictedLP2 and RestrictedDual are both polynomially solvable. In addition, note that our approximate separation oracle relaxes all the constraints and therefore we must have OPT(RestrictedLP2) = OPT(RestrictedDual) ≥Ô PT(ModifiedDual).
Therefore, using 7, we get OPT(RestrictedLP2) ≥ OPT(Dual) = OPT(LP2).
Finally, to achieve our solution, we first solve RestrictedLP2 optimally and in polynomial time, to obtain {x * i,j } i,j∈ [n] , {x * i,S } i∈[n],S⊆[n],|S|=i which achieves an objective value more or equal to OPT(LP2). However, this solution is not necessarily feasible for LP2 since it might violate the second constraint. To make it feasible, we multiply the solution by 1 − 1/e. This will hurt our objective value by a factor of 1 − 1/e but will make all the constraints satisfied except the third constraint. For the third constraint we have i∈[n] S⊆[n],|S|=i λ i x * i,S f i (S) ≥ T (1 − 1/e) and this finishes the proof.
Next, given Lemma 2, we show how to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let x * be the solution obtained by Lemma 2, and let r * and T * be the revenue and user engagement generated by this solution. Consider a policy that would show a permutation π to users randomly, such that
This policy would exactly generate revenue r * and user engagement T * . However, unfortunately, such a policy might not exist. In the rest of this proof, we show how we can devise a policy that would generate revenue and user engagement within a constant fraction of r * and T * respectively.
To move forward, we need to use the following result due to Agrawal et al. (2010) which shows that the correlation gap of submodular functions is at most 1 − 1/e. such that P S∼D [i ∈ S] = p i . We have
where D I is the independent distribution for which the probability of drawing a subset S ⊆ [n] is
Define set V , Matroid M, and function g(.) exactly as defined in Theorem 1 in Section 3. Now pick a random subset R(x * ) ⊆ V such that each element i j ∈ V appears in R(x * ) with probability
x * i,j . Since each variable x * i,j corresponds to the marginal probability of element j appearing in position i under the assignment probabilities x * i,S , due to Lemma 3, we must have E[g(R(x * ))] ≥ i∈[n] S⊆[n],|S|=i λ i x * i,S f i (S) ≥ (1 − 1/e)T * . However, we still need to turn this solution to a permutation. To do this, we first need to present two lemmas.
Lemma 4. {x * i,j } is in the matroid polytope corresponding to M, defined to be the convex hull of all the independents sets I.
Proof. To prove this, we must show
To see why this holds, note that the solution {x * i,j } satisfy the first two constraints of LP2, and therefore we must have
Therefore, {x * i,j } satisfy the constraints of the matroid polytope of the laminar matroid M. To finish our proof, we need to define and use contention resolution schemes which provide a useful and general framework for rounding fractional solutions under submodular objective functions. For a ground set N , let P I be a convex relaxation of the constraints imposed by I ⊆ 2 N . We use the following definition and lemma from Chekuri et al. (2014) . (R(x) ). If f is monotone, then
)-balanced contention resolution scheme for any matroid polytope. Moreover the scheme is monotone and efficiently implementable.
Using Lemma 4 we know that x * is in the polytope of matroid M and using Lemma 5, we know there exists a contention resolution scheme ψ corresponding to matroid M such that
Finally, ψ(R(x * )) ∈ I and therefore, to achieve a permutation, we can round ψ(R(x * )) to a permutation without any loss in engagement using the method provided in Claim 2. Therefore this permutation would have user engagement at least (1 − 1/e) 2 T * .
We now show why this permutation also achieve a (1 − 1/e) 2 approximation in revenue compared to x * . Note that revenue consists of two terms corresponding to user engagement (identified by variables x * i,S ), and the product impressions (identified by variables x * i,j ). We already showed that we achieve (1 − 1/e) 2 approximation in user engagement. Next we show that the revenue achieved from impressions is also at least (1 − 1/e) i,j∈ [n] x * i,j r i,j . To see this, note that by Lemma 5, item i j ∈ V will be in the subset ψ(R(x * )) with probability at least (1 − 1/e)x * i,j and if that happens, by Claim 2, we know that product j will appear in one of the positions 1 to i in the final permutation.
Since by assumption, values r i,j are non-increasing in i, this shows that we achieve a (1 − 1/e) approximation in impressions compared to x * .
Finally, since by Lemma 2, x * achieves a (1 − 1/e) approximation in revenue and (1 − 1/e) approximation in user engagement, our final permutation achieves revenue and user engagement within factor (1 − 1/e) 3 of the optimum policy.
Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the class of sequential submodular maximization problems and studied two applications of such problems in the context of online retailing, namely, the problem of maximizing user engagement (motivated by improving market share) and the problem of maximizing revenue subject to a lower bound for user engagement (motivated by improving key financial metrics while preserving market share). For maximizing user engagement, we presented an optimal (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm. For the problem of maximizing revenue, we provided a bi-criteria approximation algorithm where the platform is guaranteed to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, while preserving a constant fraction of the target lower bound on market share.
Our technical contributions in this paper were two-fold. First, we provided a reduction of sequential submodular maximization problems to the well-known class of submodular maximization problems subject to a laminar matroid constraint. This allows relying on the rich literature of submodular maximization under matroid constraints to achieve approximate solutions, particularly for the unconstrained version of sequential submodular maximization problems. Second, we provided a full characterization of the polytope of feasible (deterministic or randomized) ranking policies.
Although this characterization requires an exponential number of variables and constraints, we showed how to approximate objective functions over this polytope by solving a simpler polynomialsize linear program using Ellipsoid method.
A natural open question arising here would be to improve the approximation ratio for the bicriteria approximation algorithms of Section 4. One other question involves the revenue structure: whether an approximation algorithm is possible if we allow for pay-per-transaction in the revenue function. Another natural direction would be to study more complicated browsing patterns which may be of interest particularly if the platform is selling impressions on a website with a heterogenous pool of users who tend to visit different parts of the website (such as an online newspaper).
Finally, it would be interesting identify other applications in which sequential submodular maximization problems appear. This may also lead to the study of such problems under different forms of constraints, which may admit interesting techniques on how to approach submodularity under the combinatorial structure of permutations.
Appendix A: Maximizing Engagement under Coverage Function Choice Model
Consider the case where each user of type i has an interest set P i ∈ [n]. If the products are shown in order π ∈ Π, a user of type i will click on an item if and only if P i ∩ {π 1 , . . . , π i } = ∅. In other words, a user of type i will click on a product iff there exists at least one item in their interest set that appears in the first i positions. Denote the optimal number of clicks by OP T . In this section, we provide a 1 − 1/e approximation for this problem based on a linear programming formulation and a fast dependent randomized rounding.
We provide a linear programming formulation similar to that of the maximum coverage. We start by the IP formulation of the problem. For a given permutation π, let x ∈ {0, 1} n×n be the indicator matrix where x i,j corresponds to product j appearing in position i.
Note that a user of type k will click on a product if k i=1 j∈P k x i,j ≥ 1. We also introduce another vector y ∈ {0, 1} n , where y i in the indicator variable corresponding to a user with type i clicking on a product. In order to achieve the linear formulation of the model, we relax all the indicators to be in [0, 1] . This leads to the following LP.
As we discussed, x imposed by any given permutation π and the vector y corresponding to the users attracted by π form a feasible (integral) solution of LP3. This includes the optimal permutation π * . Therefore, the optimal value of this LP, is an upper bound on the maximum expected number of users that will click on a product.
A.1. Rounding the LP Solution
For any give (perhaps infeasible) solution (x, y) of LP3, let LP (x, y) be the value of the objective function. We prove the following result.
Proposition 4. For any give feasible solution (x, y), it is possible to construct an integral feasible solution (x,ỹ) such that LP (x,ỹ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)LP (x, y). Moreover, this can be done in polynomial time.
Note that any integral solution corresponds to a permutation of items. Therefore, the following corollary will immediately follow if we consider the optimal LP solution (x * , y * ).
Corollary 1. It is possible to find a permutation π in polynomial time such that (1 − 1/e)LP (x * , y * ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)OP T .
In order to prove Proposition 4, we will provide a (dependent) randomized rounding method that achieves (1 − 1/e) approximation in expectation. A standard transformation Las Vegas to Monte Carlo algorithms can then be used to achieve an actual (1 − 1/e) approximation.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that we wanted to produce a (potentially infeasible) solution (x,ŷ) that satisfied all the LP constraints except the second constraint. In this scenario, for each position i ∈ [n], we could choose exactly one product j(i) at random, according to the probabilities {x i,j : j ∈ [n]}. Note that this is well defined, as j∈[n] x i,j = 1 for any given i ∈ [n]. We letx i,j(i) = 1 and letx i,j = 0 for all j = j(i). We repeat this process independently at random for all values of where the last equality is a result of our rounding process being independent for all k ∈ [n]. We remind that according to our rounding process P[ j∈P ix k,j = 0] = P[j(k) / ∈ P i ] = 1 − j∈P i x k,j .
Hence,
However, k≤i j∈P i x k,j ≥ y i . Therefore, according to the inequality of arithmetic geometric means, we have P[ŷ i = 0] ≤ (1 − y i /i) i . Consequently, due to the fact that 0 ≤ y i ≤ 1 and i ≥ 1, we
LP (x,ŷ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)LP (x, y).
As the last step of the proof, we exchange the solution in a way that it satisfies the third constraint of LP3. Without compromising the objective function. To do so, for the items that appear multiple times according tox, we only show them at the first slot that they appear. Moreover, we assign all other items to the remaining slots in an arbitrary order. To make this process rigorous, for each item j let f irst(j) be the first rank where item j is shown according tox, i.e. f irst(j) = min{i :x i,j = 1}. If item j is not shown anywhere according tox, then we define f irst(j) = 0. Let U = {j : f irst(j) = 0} be the set of items not shown. Also, let V = [n] \ {f irst(j) : j ∈ [n]} be the set of all slots that show an item repeatedly (i.e., not for the first time). Clearly, |U | = |V | = n for some n ∈ [n]. We index the elements of U arbitrarily so that U = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j n }. Similarly, let V = {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n }.
For every j / ∈ U , we definex f irst(j),j = 1 andx k,j = 0 for all k = f irst(j). Also, for every j l ∈ U where l ∈ [n ], we definex k l ,j l = 1 andx k,j l = 0 for all k = k l . By construction,x defines an integral matching and satisfies the constraints of LP3. We also defineỹ =ŷ. Note that for every given i ∈ [n], we have k≤i j∈P ix k,j = j∈P i I f irst(j)≤i . Hence, if k≤i j∈P ix k,j = 0, then f irst(j) > i for all j ∈ P i . This means that k≤i j∈P ix k,j = 0 too. Therefore, ifŷ i = 1, (i.e., customer i is attracted according toŷ), then k≤i j∈P ix k,j ≥ 1 and subsequently,ỹ i =ŷ i ≤ 1 ≤ k≤i j∈P ix k,j . This shows that (x,ỹ) is a feasible integral solution of LP3. However, sinceỹ =ŷ, we have LP (x,ỹ) =
LP (x,ŷ) which combined with (8) completes the proof.
Appendix B: Investigating an Alternate Approach to Maximizing Engagement
Another natural approach to maximize user engagement would have been to maximize g(.) directly over the space of subsets S ⊂ V that correspond to permutations. We can do this by treating a permutation as a perfect matching between products and positions and then, maximizing the multilinear extension of g(.) defined as
over the polytope of perfect matchings characterized by the following constraints.
i∈[n]
x j i = 1 ∀j ∈ [n], j∈[n]
where x j i corresponds to i j getting picked. Interestingly, as we show in the following example, this is impossible, since as opposed to the matroid polytope, we can no longer always round a fractional solution x in the perfect matching polytope to an integral matching without any loss in the value of G(x).
Example. Suppose we have four products and four types of users with choice functions f 1 (.), · · · , f 4 (.). In addition, we assume λ i = 1/4 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Let f 1 (.), f 3 (.), and f 4 (.) to be always zero. For f 2 (.) we assume a coverage function on {a, b} where products 1 and 3 cover a and products 2 and 4 cover b. where the value in row i and column j corresponds to x j i . This can be uniquely written as 0.5M 1 + 0.5M 2 where M 1 and M 2 are complete matchings. Our multilinear extension G(.) achieves a higher value on 0.5M 1 + 0.5M 2 compared to either M 1 or M 2 . This proves that we cannot round losslessly in the matching polytope.
However, following the same logic as Theorem 1, since any fractional perfect matching is in the matroid polytope of M , we can always losslessly round any fractional perfect matching to an independent set in matroid M . For this example, we can for instance round the fractional since the repetition of the first item will be removed and the last item will move one position back. Then we add the remaining items (third item) at the end. The value of the G(.) on this perfect matching, is no less than the initial point.
Appendix C: Optimal Value of Relaxation LP2 vs. Optimal Revenue
We have seen in Section 4.2 that linear program LP2 is a relaxation to the revenue of the optimal policy. Below we show by an example that the objective value of LP2 might in fact be strictly more than the revenue of the optimal policy.
Example 2. Consider a setting where all the values of r i,j are zero and also T = 0. Also let λ i = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and K = 100. Also suppose all the users share the same choice function, i.e. all the functions f i are identical for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Suppose we have four products 1, 2, 3, 4. We define sets and their rewards as follows: 
